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CASE COMMENTS
tations are made to the defendant by responsible officers of the
state that a reward in the form of immunity or a lesser punishment
than might be expected will be given in return for a plea of guilty
and the defendant, in good faith, relies on these promises, and
pleads guilty. The effect has been to preclude the exercise of free
will and judgment by the defendant and his plea is not voluntary.
People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422, 145 P.2d 657 (1944).
Because constitutional rights are involved here it is necessary
that the defendant's plea be made voluntarily and with full knowl-
edge and understanding on his part and that the rules for accepting
such a plea be strictly adhered to by the courts. Even though the
principal case may be distinguished from the majority of cases on
this point, because the coercion was done in open court by a trial
judge, its ruling inevitably follows these well established criminal
law principles ordained to protect the constitutional rights of
defendants.
G. D. G.
EVmENCE-WGnT OF EVmENCE AND CRmDBILrT OF Wrr-
NmssEs-JUoRO's CovmvoN KNWVLEDGE AND ExmuENcE.-P's de-
cedent was fatally injured when an automobile driven by D at an
excessive speed left the road and -went into a creek. D testified that
at the time of the accident he felt the effects of beer which he had
consumed during the course of the evening and that he had driven
at excessive speed earlier on the evening of the accident. Judg-
ment for P. Held, reversing lower court, that P's decedent was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when he knew
or should have known of the great danger incident to the journey
and, though having reasonable opportunity to leave the automobile,
voluntarily continued therein as a passenger. Hutchinson v.
Mitchell, 101 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1957).
The subject of this comment is a question raised in the dis-
senting opinion of Browning, J., in the principal case, of the
propriety of a juror's use of his common general knowledge and
experience in determining the weight and credibility to be given
to the evidence presented before him.
In general a juror may act only upon evidence that is properly
presented before him during the course of the trial; but this does
not preclude him from acting upon and taking notice of facts that
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are of such notoriety as to be matters of common knowledge and
experience. 9 WIGmOHE, EvIDENCE § 2570 (3d ed. 1940); 1 JoNEs,
EvmENCE § 134 (4th ed. 1938). It is this common knowledge and
experience which enables a juror to make a just and intelligent
decision and in light of which he selects and weighs those facts
which are to be considered by him in arriving at a decision. See
Rostad v. Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., 101 Ore. 569, 201 Pac.
184 (1921); Jenney Elec. Co. v. Branham, 145 Ind. 314, 41 N.E. 448
(1895). The normal inference or presumption which one may draw
from a set of facts is but a manifestation of the jurors' consideration
of these facts in relation to the "ordinary course of events" or in rela-
tion to the "ordinary experiences of mankind." See Gunn v. Ohio
River R.R., 36 W. Va. 165, 14 S.E. 465 (1892); of. Helm v. Manu-
facturers Light & Heat Co., 86 W. Va. 628, 104 S.E. 59 (1920).
Experience is a desirable, if not necessary, characteristic of a juror.
lenney Elec. Co. v. Branham, supra.
While a juror may consider facts which are matters of common
knowledge in judging the weight and credibility to be given to the
evidence, he may not consider facts which are only within his per-
sonal knowledge. Levine's Loan Office, Inc. v. Starke, 140 Va. 712,
125 S.E. 688 (1924); cf. Thorn v. Addison Bros. & Smith, Inc.,
119 W. Va. 479, 194 S.E. 771 (1937); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Allen,
113 W. Va. 691, 169 S.E. 610 (1933). A juror who has knowledge
of any relative fact in issue may not disclose this fact to the jury
alone, but must make such disclosure in open court. W. VA. CoDE
c. 56, art. 6, § 18 (Michie 1955). A decision rendered solely upon a
juror's personal knowledge would be unintelligible in light of the
record evidence and would (stating but one result) unjustly de-
prive the unsuccessful party of his rights to challenge the credibility
of such "outside" evidence. Washburn v. Milwaukee & L.W.R.R.,
59 Wis. 364, 18 N.W. 328 (1884).
Since a juror may consider matters of common knowledge and
experience in reaching a verdict upon the law and evidence of the
case, it is proper for the court to give an instruction informing the
jurors of this fact. Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45 (1881); Rostad v.
Portland Ry. Light & Power Co., supra; Cincinnati, H. & I.R.R. v.
Gregor, 150 Ind. 625, 50 N.E. 760 (1898); Jenny Elec. Co. v. Bran-
ham, supra. Contra, Washburn v. Milwaukee & L.W.R.R., supra.
Refusal to give such an instruction, in the proper case, may lead the
jurors to believe that they must accept the truth of testimony which,
as men of ordinary experience, they know to be false, or the finality
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of conclusions reached by witnesses which, as men of general knowl-
edge, they know to be unreasonable. See Head v. Hargrave, supra;
fenney Elec. Co. v. Branham, supra. By the same token, it would be
improper for the court to give an instruction which may lead the
jurors to believe that they can use their personal knowledge in
arriving at a verdict; or to give an instruction which states that a
matter is of common knowledge when, in fact, it is not Burrows v.
Delta Transp. Co., 106 Mich. 582, 64 N.W. 501 (1895); Waite v.
Teeters, 36 Kan. 604, 14 Pac. 146 (1887).
While it appears that our court has not been called upon to
decide the propriety of such an instruction, it has, on at least two
occasions, recognized that the general knowledge and experience
of a juror may be used by him in weighing and determining the
credibility of evidence. Helm v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co.,
supra; Gunn v. Ohio River R.R., supra. It appears that our court,
to be consistent would not deny the request for an instruction
which informs a juror that he may use this common knowledge and
experience which our court has recognized as being properly within
a juror's consideration. But while consistency may demand an
instruction which in its effect so informs the jurors, it is felt that
the court would not be inconsistent in denying an instruction in
these exact terms.
There is an ever present danger that a juror, by misunderstand-
ing this instruction or by judging a matter to be of common knowl-
edge, when in fact it is not, would erroneously make use of personal
knowledge in arriving at his decision. Washburn v. Milwaukee &
L.W.R.R., supra. The court, by informing the jurors of the exact
matter which they may consider as being of common knowledge,
may itself make the error in judgment. See, e.g., Waite v. Teeters,
supra. Even though it is more likely that the court will not err in
this respect, the statement of this matter may tend to influence the
jurors upon the factual issue involved. Cf. Stenger v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 90 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1955). If the matter is of common
knowledge it need not be stated; if not of common knowledge it
should not be stated. Gulf, M. & N.R.R. v. Weldy, 193 Miss. 59,
8 So. 2d 249 (1942).
It is felt that an instruction which tells the jurors that they may
use their common knowledge and general experience in arriving
at a verdict would only tend to confuse the jurors and would be
redundant in light of the usual instructions given to the jury on
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the weight and credibility which they may attach to the evidence
before them. It is submitted that an instruction which informs a
juror that he is to use his "common sense" in weighing and judging
the evidence before him is less confusing and imports substantially
the same meaning as an instruction on the juror's use of his common
knowledge and general experience.
J. D. McD.
EvmENc-WmE TAPPNG-ADMISSiBLITY OF MATT=x ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED.-At D's trial for an alcohol tax violation, testimony was
admitted concerning existence of a wire tap which had been oper-
ated by state officers in accordance with state law. As a result of
the tap, D was picked up by the state officers on a suspected nar-
cotics violation. His cargo was then found to be untaxed alcohol,
instead of narcotics, so he was turned over to the federal authorities,
who had no knowledge of the wire tap. Trial resulted in a con-
viction, affirmed on appeal. Held, on certiorari, that evidence ob-
tained by means forbidden by federal statute, whether obtained
by state or federal officers, is inadmissible in federal courts.
Benanti v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 155 (1957).
At common law, evidence was generally admissible on a trial
even though obtained illegally. See 8 WiGMoBE, EvmENcE § 2188
(3d ed. 1940). In federal courts, however, evidence procured by
federal agents in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 388 (1914). This exception to the com-
mon law rule has been broadened to include evidence obtained in
violation of federal law. E.g., Shinyu Noro v. United States, 148
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1945).
Wire tapping is not unconstitutional. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 488 (1928). A federal statute, however, now pro-
vides, in part, that no person not authorized by the sender shall
intercept any message and divulge its existence or contents to any
person. Communications Act, 1934, 48 STAT. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1952). Severe penalties are provided for violation. 48 STAT. 1100,
47 U.S.C. § 501 (1952). Prior to passage of this act, wire tap evi-
dence was admissible in federal courts. Foley v. United States, 64
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1988); Kerns v. United States, 50 F.2d 602 (6th
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